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1964] RECENT DECISIONS 1041 
ANTITRUST CIVIL PROCESS ACT-REQUIREMENTS FOR A CIVIL 
INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND-Petitioner sought an order from the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota modifying or setting aside a 
Civil Investigative Demand served upon it by the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice. The demand was issued pursuant to the Antitrust 
Civil Process Act,1 which provides a compulsory pre-complaint procedure 
through which the Department of Justice may obtain documentary informa-
tion upon which it can make a determination of whether there has occurred 
a violation of the antitrust laws.2 Section 1312(b) of the act requires that 
the demand state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged viola-
1 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-14 (1962). 
2 "Whenever the Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has reason to believe that any person 
under investigation may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material 
relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or 
criminal proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served on such a person, 
a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such material for investiga-
tion." 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1312(a) (1962). 
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tion, recite the provision of law applicable thereto, and describe the class or 
classes of material to be produced with sufficient certainty so that it can be 
fairly identified.8 Petitioner contended that since the demand served upon 
it failed to comply with these requirements it constituted a "fishing expedi-
tion"-a result not intended by Congress-and was violative of the constitu-
tional right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures guaranteed by 
the fourth amendment. Held, order denied. The power granted to the 
Attorney General by the act does not violate the fourth amendment, and 
the demand complies with the standards of section 1312(b).4 In re Gold 
Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), affd per curiam, 325 
F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).5 
The purpose of the act is to enable the Department of Justice to obtain 
documentary evidence during the course of a civil investigation to enforce 
the antitrust laws.6 Prior to the enactment of this statute, in order to 
obtain such information during the pre-complaint stage of an investigation 
the Antitrust Division had to depend mainly upon the voluntary co-
operation of those under investigation. If such cooperation was not forth-
coming, the Division attorneys had only three alternatives. They could file 
a skeleton civil complaint and use the discovery processes of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, resort to a grand jury, or request the Federal 
Trade Commission to investigate.7 This system was unsatisfactory for civil 
enforcement needs. Voluntary cooperation has often been sufficient; many 
companies, however, give only partial cooperation, while others refuse to 
cooperate at all.8 A governmental agency should not be dependent solely 
upon voluntary cooperation for the discharge of its responsibilities.0 The 
initiation of a civil complaint supported by little or no evidence is both 
unfair and unwise when its only purpose is to utilize the discovery 
mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It places 
upon the defendant the burden of preparing a costly and time-consuming 
defense to a suit which may be unwarranted and, likely as not, will be 
abandoned by the government before it goes beyond the preliminary stage.10 
8 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1312(b) (1962). 
4 Petitioner's alternative request that the court stay compliance with the order until 
the Federal Trade Commission completed its investigation of two of its competitors was 
also denied. Principal case at 398. 
5 The circuit court adopted the district court's reasoning in toto in its per curiam 
opinion; the following discussion, therefore, is based entirely upon the district court's 
opinion. 
6 H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962). 
7 Federal Trade Commission Act§ 6, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1958). 
s See Decker, The Civil Investigative Demand, 21 A.B.A. SECTION ANTITRUsr L. 370, 
373 (1962). 
o Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUsr REP. 343-48 (1955). 
10 The procedure authorized by the Civil Process Act will necessarily involve the 
expenditure of a certain amount of time and money in the gathering and duplication 
of the requested documents. However, this will vary with the number of documents 
required and the method of record keeping of the company involved, and in the majority 
of cases should be far less expensive and time consuming than the preparation of an 
adequate defense to an inaccurate or indefinite charge. 
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Unwarranted litigation places an unnecessary and costly burden on already 
congested courts. The Judicial Conference of the United States has expressed 
its disapproval of the practice.11 While evidence obtained in a grand jury 
investigation can be used in a civil prosecution,12 use of the grand jury 
where civil proceedings are contemplated from the outset subverts the 
grand jury's function and debases the law by attaching a taint of criminality 
to citizens who have committed no crime.13 Finally, the power of the Federal 
Trade Commission to make investigations for the Attorney General is 
limited and unworkable.14 
Thus handicapped, the Department of Justice had often been unable 
to obtain factual information necessary to a proper determination of 
whether a civil antitrust prosecution is justified. The method prescribed by 
the Antitrust Civil Process Act for obtaining this essential information is 
not new. Numerous federal agencies and officials have similar powers, and 
at the time of the passage of the act seventeen states authorized such a 
procedure for enforcement of state antitrust laws.15 The first impetus for 
11 No plaintiff, including the Government, may pretend to bring charges in order to 
discover whether actual charges should be brought. Procedures in Antitrust and Other 
Protracted Cases Adapted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, reproduced in 
Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 67 (1952). "[T]hose rules ••• were 
not intended to make the courts an investigatory adjunct to the Department of Justice." 
Ibid. 
12 United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684 (1958); FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 6 (e). 
13 United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., supra note 12, at 683-84 (dictum); An'Y 
GEN. NAT'L COMM. REP. 343 (1955). 
14 The power of the Federal Trade Commission to investigate applies only with 
respect to corporations and their relationship to partnerships and associations, 38 Stat. 
721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a), (b) (1958), whereas the present statute applies to partnerships 
and associations. It applies only to enjoin future violations, not to prosecute past violations. 
There is uncertainty as to whether the Commission is required to make such a pre-
complaint investigation for the Attorney General, although upon application of the 
Attorney General the Commission is required to investigate whether there is compliance 
with a final decree against a corporation in an antitrust suit. 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 46(c) (1958). The Department of Justice attorneys would be unable to maintain control of 
their investigations if reliance on the FTC were necessary. It would also be a considerable 
drain on both the manpower and budget of the Commission. H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra 
note 5, at 4. 
15 Federal agencies and officials having similar power are: Federal Trade Commission, 
38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958); National Labor Relations Board, 49 Stat. 455 
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1958); Atomic Energy Commission, 68 Stat. 948 (1954), 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958); Census Bureau, 13 U.S.C. §§ 221, 223, 224 (1958); 
Civil Aeronautics Board, 72 Stat. 766 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1377 (1958); Federal Aviation 
Agency, 72 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1484 (1958); Securities Exchange Commission, 53 
Stat. 1174 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu (1958); 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1958); 
Federal Communications Commission, 48 Stat. 1078 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 220 (1958); Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 41 Stat. 484 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1958); Federal 
Power Commission, 41 Stat. 1065 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1958); National 
Science Foundation, 72 Stat. 353, 42 U.S.C. § 1872a (1958); Secretary of Agriculture, 49 
Stat. 1497 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § 7a (1958); 52 Stat. 65 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1373 (1958); 
53 Stat. 1289 (1939), 7 U.S.C. § 1603 (1958); Secretary of the Army, 49 Stat. 671 (1935), 33 
U.S.C. § 506 (1958); Secretary of Labor, 64 Stat. 1271 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 780 (1958); Veterans 
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this legislation came, in 1955, from the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee To Study the Antitrust Laws.16 Since that time the purpose sought 
to be achieved by the act has encountered no appreciable opposition. 
Rather, the act has been unanimously endorsed by government officials 
and by private parties.17 The statute was designed to provide the Antitrust 
Division with an effective means of investigation where civil proceedings 
are initially contemplated and voluntary cooperation fails, in order that it 
may more fairly and adequately enforce the antitrust laws. While there has 
been general accord with the purpose of the statute, there has also been 
considerable fear that it might be used for "fishing expeditions" into the 
private affairs of companies. These fears were expressed by several con-
gressmen during debate on the bill.18 They were assured that the require-
ments of the statute as to the content of a demand provided more than 
adequate safeguards against misuse.19 Since the passage of the act there 
has been a great deal of speculation as to how the new authority would 
be used.20 
The demand served upon the petitioner in the principal case read: 
"This . . . Demand is issued . . . in the course of an inquiry for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether there is, or has been, a violation of the 
provisions of Title 15 United States Code Secs. 1, 2, 3, 13, 14 and 18 
by conduct of the following nature: Restrictive practices and acquisi-
tions involving the dispensing, supplying, sale, or furnishing of trading 
stamps and the purchase and sale of goods connected therewith." 
Obviously, the Department of Justice intends to construe the requirements 
of the act which were intended as safeguards against abuse as generally as 
Administrator, 72 Stat. 1237, 38 U.S.C. § 3311 (1958); Secretary of the Treasury, REv. STAT. 
§ 3649 (1875), 31 u.s.c. § 548 (1958); 26 u.s.c. § 7602 (1958). 
State statutes which have authorized such procedure are: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1407 
(1956); HAWAII REv. LAws § 205A-16 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 48-105 (1948); KAN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-153 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. § 51:144 (1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 
137, § 48 (1954); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.310 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 51-115 (1947); 
NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-807 (1943); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 343; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-10 (1960); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 82 (1951); S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-111 (1962); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 7439 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-58-3 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.110 
(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.20 (1957). 
16 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 346-47. 
17 H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 5, at 5. 
18 108 CONG. REc. 4000, 4002 (1962) (remarks of Representatives Smith and Whitener). 
19 "The bill ••. provides every conceivable safeguard for the company to which a civil 
investigative demand is addressed.'' Id. at 3998 (remarks of Representative Geller). 
"The grant of a civil process to the Attorney General does not mean, however, that he 
shall now be permitted to engage in fishing expeditions .••• [T]he Committee has imposed 
effective safeguards to insure that the tool will not be converted into a weapen.'' Id. at 
3999 (remarks of Representative McCulloch). 
"The ••• Act contains many important safeguards, and could in no way be used for 
fishing expeditions.'' Id. at 4002 (remarks of Representative Patman). 
20 As one antitrust attorney stated, "The Department of Justice now has the oppor-
tunity to prove that the proponents were correct.'' Von Drehle, Significant Antitrust 
Developments, MICH. S.B.J. Dec. 1962, p. 17-18. 
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possible so as to reduce the specificity required of a demand and thus 
facilitate investigation. However, the decision of the court in the principal 
case sanctioning this demand cannot be said to end speculation as to how 
far the courts will allow the government to carry this interpretation. The 
court treated the petitioner's contentions separately. It first held that the 
power granted to the Attorney General does not violate the search and 
seizure clause, as the Supreme Court has said that "the gist of the [fourth 
amendment] protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the 
disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable,"21 and that modern views are 
more tolerant of administrative investigations.22 The court then held that 
the demand justified a liberal interpretation in view of the circumstances 
and that it fairly complied with the requirements of the act. The difficulty 
of determining the effect of this case arises from the fact that the court in 
these holdings did not resolve the issue presented to it. The petitioner's 
contention was that the demand failed to meet the requirements of the 
act and constituted a "fishing expedition"-a result not intended by Con-
gress-and therefore was an unconstitutional search and seizure. The very 
authorities cited by the court in sustaining the constitutional validity of 
the act uphold the petitioner's claim that if the demand was unreasonable 
and not within the authority of the statute, it violated the fourth amend-
ment.23 The statements of congressmen to the effect that the restrictions 
embodied in the act were intended to safeguard the person on whom the 
demand is served from "fishing expeditions" support petitioner's contention 
that if the demand does not meet these requirements it constitutes a 
"fishing expedition" outside the authority granted by the statute. Thus, the 
vital question is whether the requirements are to be strictly or narrowly 
interpreted so as to include or exclude the demand in question. The 
interpretation of the requirements will depend upon the view one takes as 
to what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of Congress in passing the 
act. The court in the principal case felt that to insist upon too much 
specificity would defeat the purpose of the act and encourage frequent 
challenges directed against the sufficiency of the demand. The test . as 
envisioned by the court in the principal case is whether the person being 
investigated is sufficiently informed and whether the relevancy of the docu-
ments may be determined. Thus, since petitioner apparently understood 
21 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). 
22 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950). 
23 "The ••• investigative function, in searching out violations ••. is essentially the 
same as the grand jury's or the court's in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery 
of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations. These are that he [the investigative 
official] shall not act arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority ...• " Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 377 U.S. 186, 216 (1946). 
"Of course a governmental investigation ... may be of such a sweeping nature and so 
unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power .... 
But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not 
too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant." United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., supra note 22, at 652. 
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the scope and intent of the demand, the requirements were satisfied. How-
ever, it is equally arguable that a strict construction of the requirements 
ought to be followed, especially since such a construction would place little 
or no hardship on the government and would not impede its investigations 
to any substantial extent.24 Nor would it encourage the challenging of 
demands . .& long as standards are specifically stated and consistently applied 
one should be able to determine whether the demand meets such limits, 
regardless of whether the standards set wide or narrow limits. As the intent 
of Congress was clearly to provide a tool, not a weapon, the utmost care 
should be taken to see that the process does not evolve into a ready vehicle 
for the examination of the private records of any company which might 
incur the disfavor of the Department of Justice. The implications of the 
principal case in antitrust law, however, will not be clear until other courts 
have had occasion to test its rationale in future litigation. 
Mary Mandana Long 
24 "There would appear to be no hardship on the Government to prepare a descriptive 
statement of the desired information. Since much of the investigatory work is done by 
FBI agents, something of this kind is already being prepared." Decker, supra note 8, at 575. 
